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A commonsense and empirically supported approach to explaining metropolitan real house
price changes is for the theory to describe an equilibrium price level towhich the market is
constantly adjusting. The determinants of real house price appreciation, then, can be divided into
two groups, one that explains changes in the equilibrium price and the other that accounts forthe
adjustment dynamics or changing deviations from the equilibrium price.
The former group includes the growth in real income and real construction costs and
changes in the real after-tax interest rate. The latter group consists of lagged real
and the difference between the actual and equilibrium real house price levels. Either group of
variables can explain a little over two-fifths of the variation in real house price movements in 30
cities over the 1977-92 period; together, they explain three-fifths.
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and NBER Columbus, OH 43210-1399Real house prices have swung sharply in metropolitan areas on the two 13.5.
coasts during the last decade (Abraham and Hendershott, 1993). In three
Northeast cities for which we have data (Boston, Nassau-Suffolk and Newark), real
prices rose by 92 percent during the 1983-88 period and through 1993 have since
declined by 25 percent. In eleven west coast cities, real prices rose by over
50 percent between 1984 and 1990 and, so far, have declined by 15 percent.' The
rest of the country (excluding the mineral states that were devastated by the
middle l980s oil price collapse) has not experienced such sharp fluctuations.
For a sample of nine Upper Midwest and five Southeast cities, real prices
increased by only 13 percent in the 1983-92 decade, about reversing the earlier
1979-82 decline. Table 1 reports the growth of real house prices across 30
cities and in various regions over the 1977-92 period.
Real price movements in the stable Upper Midwest and Southeast are amenable
to explanation with the basic Capozza-Helsley urban model (A&R, 1993). Real
construction cost inflation, real income growth, and changes in real
interest rates alone explain about half of the variation in real price inflh\.tion,
and the explanation accounts for both the general real price decline in the early
1980s and the recovery since then. The same variables help to explain real price
movements in the rest of the country.
While AMPs empirical results are correctly signed, of appropriate
magnitude, statistically significant, and broadly consistent with the findings
of other researchers, their model largely fails to explain the sharp, prolonged
cycles in Northeast and West real house prices. That is, the results suffer not
from large random standard errors, but rather from sustained, serially correlated
Reports in the popular press of larger real price declines refer to larger
houses than those in our sample. Higher price houses in California appear to
have declined significantly more than our "average" price houses (Case and
Shiller, 1993).deviations, which are generally described as bubbles (Stiglitz,1990).
Some earlier work suggests the existence of housing marketbubbles. Case
and Shiller (1989) report estimates where the lagged appreciationrate entered
price regressions with a coefficient of 0.3. The lagged appreciationrate is an
obvious bubble-builder; once appreciation accelerates, the laggedvariable
magnifies the increase. Further, Shiller (1990) interprets surveyresults from
four cities as indicating a strong extrapolation of recent local appreciationin
the formation of expectations.Be offers this as a possible reason "why
speculative bubbles appear to be local phenomena, occurringin one city and not
in another relatively nearby city" (p. 60). Finally, in our earlier paper,the
lagged appreciation rate entered the regressions restricted to the morevolatile
coastal cities with a coefficient twice as large as in the stabler inland cities,
suggesting that some cities may be more prone to bubbles than others.
But as bubbles grow larger and larger, they likely create an offsetting
tendency to burst. Case and Shiller (1990) present weak evidence to this effect:
the appreciation rate lagged more than one period enters negatively, although not
with statistical significance.Incorporating a proxy for the tendency for
bubbles to burst, as well as to build, is a major component of this paper. Our
proxy is the deviation between the actual metropolitan house pricelevel and a
"fundamental" price level based upon our empirical estimation.2 The bubble
buster proxy does indeed work and is especially useful in explaining the large
cyclical swings in real house prices in the West.That is, the notion of
adjustment to an equilibrium price seems to be a useful one.
Forecasts of future real house price appreciation thus depend on two
2Theuse of this variable also addresses what some viewed as a shortcoming
in our earlier paper, the absence of a role for variables reflecting the level
of house prices (Wilcox, 1993).
2factors: forecasts of changes n fundamentals (real income and real after-tax
interest rates) and of initial gaps between actual and equilibrium price levels.
Regarding the latter, it is widely perceived in early 1994 that houses in the
coastal markets are "overpriced" and may continue to weaken, while houses in the
oil and resource states are rebounding from "below equilibrium' prices. Our
results provide no hints on future fundamentals, but we do have estimates of just
how much more prices on the coasts may still need to fall in the absence of
changes in fundamentals.
The body of the paper is partitioned into three parts. Section I presents
the estimation model and the data. Section II reports the empirical estimates
and indicates both how well they explain real regional house price cycles and
what disequilibria existed at the beginning of 1993. Section III contains some
simulations to illustrate the real price dynamics implied by the estimates and
the sensitivity of the dynamics to variation in the estimates. A conclusion
closes.
I. The Model and Data for the Explanatory Variables
The Model
Capozza and Helsley (1989 and 1990) present models in which real land value
is the sum of four components: the real value of agricultural land rent, the cost
of developing the land for urban use, the value of "accessibility," and the value
of expected future real rent increases. Concern with the real value of houses
adds the real cost of constructing houses to these components (this variab'le
could also represent the cost-of-developing-land component). The conversion of
a stream of rents into a value introduces the real-after-tax interest rate as a
determinant of real house prices, and the value of accessibility should vary
3positively with real income in the metropolitan area.
Following this framework. Abraham and Hendershott (1993) expressthe growth
in equilibrium real house prices (in a specific city) duringperiod t, p*, as
a linear function of the growth in realconstruction costs, ct, in real income
per working age adult, Yt. and in employment, e,and the change in real after-
tax interest rates, r.
a + + a2e++ a.r (1)
With anerror term,' 9reflecting adjustment dynamics (e.g., bubbles) as well
as random error, we have:
(2)
Regarding the adjustment dynamics. we specify the error term as
+ +A2(1ogP*_1
—logP_1)+ (3)
where logP*1 -logP..1is the log difference between the equilibrium and actual
real price levels (in city i) at the beginning of period tandcisa random
error.(All growth rates are measured as log differences.) For convenience, the
disequilibrium measure is calculated as the simple difference in two log-levels.
rather than the percentage difference between nominal indices. Other things
equal, the greater the real price change the previous period or the equilibrium-
actual price difference at the beginning of the period, the larger will be the
actual price change during the period. For A1 positive, the first variable acts
to perpetrate growth, generating a price bubble; the second variable, for A2
positive, captures the tendency of the bubble to eventually burst, Substituting
equs (1) and (3) into equ (2), we have
4Pt a (a0+A0)+aict+a2et • a3y+.a.zc +X1p.1+A2(logPt1—logP_,)+• (2')
Theeconometric difficulty is that equ (2') cannotbeestimated without
knowing *, which itself depends on the estimates from (2'). In effect, we need
to use values of P* in the estimation of (2') that are consistent with the
p*'s that we compute after the estimation.
We finesse this difficulty by first estimating equ (2') without the A2
term. We then calculate p* and cumulate it over time to obtain a first-pass time
series on P* for each city. To illustrate, if we assumed that house prices
were in equilibrium in the initial year (t—O), we would compute logP*.. as
JogP*_1logp0+p (4)
Anindex for P would be constructed similarly by replacing p*j with p.3
In the empirical estimation, we set P0 —P*—1in 1983 and use the first-
pass estimates of p*1 to compute P*,.' We then add (logP*1-logP.1) to equ
(2') for reestimation. If logP*. -logP1,Pt-i and the determinants of p* are
uncorrelated, the estimates of the a's and thus of p*1 will be unchanged. If the
estimated regression coefficients change, we then recompute logP* from equ (4)
and reestimate equ (2'). After a few iterations, the coefficient estimates
stabilize so that the p* and P* estimates are consistent (generally, three
iterations are required).
If equilibrium were assumed to exist in year n, we would compute values
after n as in equ (4) but with P, replacing P. For values before n, logP is
reduced by Ep*_, where the sumM goes backwardfromn.
We choose 1983 because the early 1980s were a period of generally falling
real prices in the West and especially the Midwest, while after 1983 real prices
exploded in the West and especially the Northeast.
5EaDirical Droxies
Our source for metropolitan price data is a combined Fannie-Mae/Freddie-Mac
repeat-sale data base (Stephens, et.al., 1993). For a general construction cost
measure, we use the National Income and Product Accounts residential deflator.
which is really the Census Bureau deflator for new houses excluding the value of
the lot, not an index for both multifamily and single family construction. To
obtain city-specific cost estimates, we multiply the general index by the
appropriate R.S. Means Company city index adjustment factor. The R.S. Means cost
survey is applicable for industrial and commercial construction projects.
The local CPIs net of shelter are from Data Resources/McGraw-Hill.
Employment data and population aged 25-64 are from Regional Financial Associates
(RFA). Income data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Department of
Commerce.Because the 1992 NSA income and population estimates are not yet
available, we have used RFA forecasts to estimate these numbers. The general
deflator is the CPIU-Xl, which is the official national consumer price index
beginning in 1982 and the official index purged of the mismeasurement caused by
rapid increases in mortgage rates in the late l970s and early l980s (see the
Economic Report of the President).
We specify the real after-tax interest rate as the nominal
after-tax rate less a weighted average of the expected national general inflation
rate and the expected local house price inflation rate:
R —(l-r)i
-(wpn+(l-w)pl), (5)
where i is a nominal interest rate, r is the relevant tax rate, pn is the
expected national inflation rate, p1 the expected local house price inflation





We include both the bracketed first ten (the RAT interest rate using the
expected national inflation rate) and (pn-pl) as regressors. The weight applied
to the national appreciation rate, l-w, can then be computed as the coefficient
on the inflation differential divided by that on RAT.
We use the one-year Treasury rate for the financing rate and the previous
year's national CPI appreciation rate for expected general inflation and the
previous year's local house price appreciation for the local expected
appreciation. Poterba's time series on the marginal tax rate for households with
real adjusted gross income of $30,000 in 1990 is employed (the 1990 tax rate is
assumed to hold in 1991 and 1992).
II. Empirical Estimates
Table 2 contains the basic model estimates.Column I reproduces the
estimates from our earlier study, and column 2 lists comparable estimates for the
new data set. The new set differs from the old in two major respects. First,
the dependent variable is now computed from a joint Fannie-Freddie data set of
repeat transactions. Second, we were able to fix up the real employment growth
variable. As a result, we have added an intermediate year (1982) and a city
(Seattle) to the data base. With the further addition of 1992, the data base is
expanded from 319 observations to 420 (30 cities for 14 years).
As can be seen by comparing columns 1 and 2, the data revision and
extension do not alter the results significantly. Only the coefficient on the
change-in-local-price deviation changes by over 12 percent or more than half a
standard deviation. All t-ratios rise, with that on the change-in-local-price
deviation increasing the most, -1.5 to -3.5.
7Both employment growth and real income growth per adult work as expected.
In the earlier paper, we noted that which variable is theoretically appropriate
depends on the model assumptions. Hera we have experimented some with different
real Income growth measures.Column 3 gives the result with the variables
replaced by a total real income growth. As can be seen, it performs slightly
better than the two components used in the earlier paper.
The specification in column 3 is reproduced for comparison in column 1 of
Table 3. Column 2 includes the new variable reflecting the percentage deviation
of actual from estimated-equilibrium price levels. While the coefficient is
statistically significant with the expected sign, the coefficient is a small 0.05
and raises the equation explanatory power by a trivial amount.
Next, we divide the sample roughly into halves: the 14 cities in the
Northeast and West and the other 16 cities (Upper Midwest, Southeast and Texas).
We have lumped "Texas" with the Midwest and Southeast, but this is a far from
perfect aggregation. Dallas and Houston price behaviors differ from each other
and from any other region (see Table 1).Prior to the most recent 1987-92
period, Dallas is much like the Upper Midwest, but in the most recent period its
price decline is even more severe than in the West.Houston is like the
Southeast, except in the middle l980s, when Houston experienced sharp real price
declines.
The empirical estimates in columns 3 and 4 suggest common responses of the
"coastal" and "inland" cities to real income growth and the user cost variables
(changes in real after-tax interest rates and local price deviation), but
substantially different responses to the disequilibrium variables (lagged
appreciation rate and deviation of the actual from equilibrium price level) and
to construction cost inflation. The common coefficients are similar to those in
8column 2: 0.7 on real income growth,-0.5 on the change in real after-tax
interest rates and -0.15 on the change in relative inflation. The coefficient
on construction cost inflation is only 0.16 for the Northeast-West versus 0.57
for the rest of the country.Moreover, evidence of price bubbles is much
stronger for the Northeast-West (coefficients of 0.5 on lagged appreciation and
0.10 on the price disequilibrium variable) than for the rest of the country (0.2
for lagged appreciation and effectively zero for the disequilibrium variable).
Column 5 combines the two subsamples, but allows for different constants
and differential impacts of construction cost inflation, lagged appreciation, and
disequilibrium (constrained to zero for the 16 city group). The coefficient
estimates are as expected, with a slightly improved R-squared. Table 4 uses
these estimates to determine the ability of the model to explain the
substantially different movements in real regional house prices since 1983. The
decade is divided into the boom years of 1983-88 (1983-90 for the West) and the
subsequent bust. We report, for four regions, the actual cumulative log change.
the fitted, and the dynamically simulated.In the latter, we substitute,
beginning in 1984, the predicted real price change for the actual lagged price
change and in calculation of the lagged price level in the disequilibrium
variable.
Comparing the actual and simulated changes, we explain roughly three-
quarters of real price swings in the Southeast, Upper Midwest and the West, about
half the changes in the Northeast, and only about a quarter in Texas. The
explanations for the West, Northeast and even Texas are substantial improvemefits
on our earlier paper (contrast, MB. 1993, table 9).Of course, the Texas
results are still far from satisfactory.
Next, we decompose the cumulative actual price appreciation since 1983 (the
9equilthritim year) into an increase in the equilibrium priceand a residual, which
is simultaneously determined with the equilibrium process. The qualitative
results regarding current disequilibria. shown in Table 5, areconsistent with
expectations; the coasts were overpriced in 1992, Texas wasunderpriced, and the
great in-between was fairly priced. But it'sworth looking more closely at each
area's numerical results.
Real prices in the Northeast rose 92 percent from 1983 through 1988, before
dropping 25 percent through 1992. Over the same 1983-88 period,the equilibrium
rate grew at a historically rapid 3 plus percent a year. but thatstill left a
yawning 50 percent gap in 1988 between actual and equilibrium prices.Actual
levels have fallen more than equilibrium price since then, but the equation
suggeEts that a 30 percent gap remained at the end of 1992 (probably 25 percent
at the end of 1993). Unfortunately, because we were able to explain only 60
percent of the inidl980s surge. we may well have under-forecasted the equilibrium
price rise, and thus the actual-equilibrium price gap could be less than 25
percent.
In both the Southeast and the Midwest, real prices rose by much smaller
amounts between 1983 and 1992, and actual prices remained within a few percent
of the equilibrium level in the 1980s. Texas is the inverse of the Northeast:
property values collapsed and for reasons not well captured in the model. Thus,
we have a huge 35 percent measure of underpricing and very little confidence in
it.
The Western regions had smaller cumulative increases than the Northeast.
and the fundamentals were stronger overall. Thus the disequilibrium gaps are a
smaller 15 and 20 percent. While real prices fell significantly in 1993, how
much was a closing of the 1992 gap and how much was a further deterioration in
10California's fundamentals is unclear.
III. House Price Dynamics
Of perhaps greater interest than the numerical results for specific regions
are the implications of the estimates for regional house price dynamics. The
error ten 6, as specified in equation (3), presents a dynamic tension for the
effect of lagged price change on current price inflation: lagged change enters
with a positive coefficient as a growth rate and with a negative coefficient
through the lagged price level.
Simulations of price booms and busts using the estimated values of A1 and
are presented in Figure 1. Four different 'boom' scenarios are overlaid on
top of an equilibrium growth rate of 1 percent.5 After being at equilibrium,
actual annual real appreciation is assumed to run for four years annually at: 14
percent (the Northeast), 8 percent (California), 4 percent (Midwest), and L
percent (trend). A dynamic solution starts in the fifth year (year 1 in the
chart), with the inflation rate equal to the sum of the equilibrium rate (1




which is equation (2') with values for A1 and A2 taken from column 5 of Table 3
for the coastal cities. There are no stochastic errors in these simulations.6
In the "Northeast" simulation, the disequilibrium tern quickly drives
Averaging the components of the equilibrium growth rate formula:
construction costs, real income, real after tax inflation rate, relative
inflation, and the constant, across time and the 14 coastal cities yields an
annual growth rate of 1.2 percent, rounded to 1 percent.
These house price simulations are similar to the wage disinflation
simulation developed in Abraham (1987).
11appreciation negative because the price level is very high relative tothe
equilibrium level (in year 5, the log difference is 4 -56—- 52percent). Real
changes stay negative through the twelfth year; if nominal generalinflation is
3 percent, nominal house price inflation will turn positive in year 8.This
assumes that the equilibrium level continues growing at one percent annually.
Should the economic fundamentals temporarily worsen, as they did in Boston, a
sharper decline and stronger bounce back could be observed.
As illustrated by the "California" and "Midwest" simulations, more modest
disequilibria impose less wrenching adjustments. In fact, real house price
appreciation in the Midwest is negative for only two years and then by trivial
amounts. Within 20 years, all four simulations have stabilized at an identical
'equilibrium' price level that is growing steadily at 1 percent per year. (In
practice, changes in the equilibrium growth rate and stochastic shocks will alter
the timing along the disequilibrium path.) These empirically estimated
coefficients imply it can take a long time --upto a decade -forprice
inflation in areas with long-term strength to recover from the bursting of a
bubble!
The adjustment coefficients are, of course, estimated with error. Figure
2 illustrates the sensitivity of the Northeast adjustment path to combinations
of increases and decreases of two standard errors in the coefficients, 0.1 for
and 0.05 for A2.With a higher coefficient on the disequilibrium price
variable, the decline is steeper and more abrupt because the overpricing premium
is eliminated more rapidly.With high coefficients on both the lagged
appreciation rate and the disequilibrium price, the price actually overshoots and
Similar to the results here, Blanchard and Katz (1992) find a peak house
price response to an employment shock in years 4-5, with the total effect
disappearing only after 12 years. -
12eventually has to rise at gseater than a one percent rate,With a high
coefficient on the lagged appreciation rate but a low coefficient on the
disequilibrium variable, the decline is relatively slow (appreciation is not
negative until the third year). but longer lasting.
The adjustment path is also sensitive to the underlying fundamentals. The
Figure 3 simulation examines the sensitivity of the California scenario to
equilibrium growth rates of 0, 1, and 2 percent. Clearly zero growth is the most
draconian, requiring that all of the 20 percent overpricing be unwound. Real
prices fall for a decade. In contrast, with two percent equilibrium growth,
roughly what the west coast experienced in the l980s, real prices decline for
only two years. This implies that it is not enough to know (believe) that houses
are overvalued by, say. 20 percent to forecast where values will be a year from
now. Even in such a case, the extent to which the equilibrium path is rising or
falling makes a fundamental contribution to real appreciation (depreciation).
IV. Conclusion
The last few years have seen the widely expanded availability of high
quality, constant-quality house price indices for metropolitan areas. As price
trends are a very localized phenomenon, a myriad of exciting research
opportunities are opening up. In this paper, we build upon an earlier attempt
(AWl, 1993) to understand cross sectional annual variation in real house price
movements in 30 cities over the 1977-92 period.
A commonsense and empirically supported approach is for the theory to
describe an equilibrium price level to which the market is constantly adjusting.
The determinants of real house price appreciation, then, can be divided into two
groups, one that explains changes in the equilibrium price andthe other that
13accounts for the adjustment dynamics or changing deviations from the equilibrium
price. The former group includes the growth in real income and real construction
costs and changes in the real after-tax interest rate. The latter group consists
of lagged real appreciation and the difference between the actual and equilibrium
real house price levels. Either group of variables can explain a little over
two-fifths of the variation in our sample; together, they explain three-fifths.
Substantial real house price booms occurred on the two coasts during the
middle and late 1980s and real prices have since been declining. Our model can
explain roughly three-quarters of real price swings in the West (as well as the
smaller changes in the Southeast and Midwest), and about half the changes in the
Northeast. However, little of the general decline in real prices in Dallas and
Houston is explained.
When this approach is applied across the country, we find as of end 1992
a huge 30 percent 'above market' premium in prices in the Northeast, a 15-20
percent premium in west coast prices, and probably significant underpricing in
Texas. Given our inability to explain part of the earlier rise in the Northeast,
that premium is probably too large. While some of the coastal premia undoubtedly
eroded in 1993, a further deterioration of fundamentals in California may also
have occurred. Thus a best guess is about a 15 percent premium on both coasts
in early 1994. The majority of the country, as represented by our Midwestern and
Southeastern cities, is near equilibrium.
flow rapidly the presumed 15 percent premia will be eliminated is uncertain.
The basic coefficient estimates suggest the years of most intense declines occur
3-6 years after the boom ends, with a possibly very long period of adjustment --
upto a dozen years of falling real prices.Favorable economic trends can
significantly blunt the magnitude of the house price disinflation required
16following a boom.
Many mysteries remain.The lagged appreciation term that represents
speculative pressures in the market performs admirably in soaking-up volatility,
but we still lack a compelling explanation for why it is needed, i.e., we don't
really know what starts the speculative bubbles. Even the detective work in Case
and Shiller (1993) does more to track the observed boom in real prices during the
l9ROs than to explain why it occurred in the first place.In terms of the
Capozza-Helsley model, we have identified a role for real income growth, but we
have been unable to identify changes in the expected growth path. Another
possibility is differing supply restrictions -- orlack of restrictions in places
such as in Texas -- thatcause real income growth spurts to have greater impacts
in some areas than in others.6 it is these areas that we recommend future
researchers explore.
We spent considerable time trying to fit cross-sectional measures of land
restrictions from Godschalk and Hartzell (1992) into our equations and were
unsuccessful in finding more than a token effect.
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Constant -.006 -.006 -.017
(-2.1) (-2.1) (-5.8)
Real Construction .457 .464 .365
CostInflation (4.2) (4.7) (3.8)
Employment .313 .345
Growth (3.2) (3.5) .774
(10.1)
Real Income .565 .500
Growthper Adult (4.4) (4.7)
Change in Real -.593 -.551 -.469
After-Tax (-4.4) (-4.5) (-4.1)
Interest Rate
Change in Local -.072 -.143 -.151
Price Deviation (-1.5) (-3.5) (-3.8)
lagged Real .402 .362 .382
Appreciation (8.7) (9.9) (11.3)
R2 .54 .53 .S5
Observations 319 420 420
18Table 3: Real Price Appreciation Allowing Different
Responses for Coastal and Texas Cities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
inland coastal
all all 16 cities 14 cities all




Constr. Cost .365 .352 .573 .163 .575
Apreciation (3.7) (5.2) (1.0) (5.3)
Constr. Cost* -.420
Appreciation (-2.3)
Real Income .774 .730 .687 .683 .684
Crowth (9.3) (7.7) (4.7) (9.2)
tRATIR -.469 -.473 -.481 -.528 -.495
(-4.2) (-3.8) (-2.5) (-4.6)
Change in -.157 -.114 -.176 -.159 ..173
Relative Inflation (-2.7) (-3.4) (2.5) (-4.4)
lagged .382 .423 .193 .515 .197
Inflation (11.6) (3.6) (10.0) (4.2)
lagged .311
Inflation* (5.0)
Deviation from .050 -.005 .102
Equilibrium (2.7) (-0.1) (3.8)
Deviation from .095
Equilibriuni* (3.9)
.55 .56 .55 .59 .60
Observations 420 420 224 196 420
*Variables multiplied by a dummy variable that is 1 for the 14 coastal cities.
19Table 4
Cumulative LogChanges,1983-92:


















*ln the West, the time periods are 1983-90 and 1990-92.
20Table S
Price Level Disequilibrium as of 1992
(Percent)
Cumulative Cumulative Disequilibrium
Actual Growth Equil. Growth as of end1992
since 1983 since 1983
East
Northeast 41 11 30
Southeast 16 15 1
Midwest
Upper Midwest 10 11 -1
Texas -32 3 -35
West
North 40 20 20
South 31 16 15
21Figure 1
Simulation of House Price Paths
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Simulation of House Price Paths





















Simulation of House Price Paths
with Alternative Equilibrium Growth Paths
(Percent)
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